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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the test in slander cases. In addition, there appears to be confusion over
whether the extrinsic-fact test was a determining factor in those cases in
which it was stated as the applicable law. These areas of confusion should
be clarified in the next appropriate case to insure that plaintiffs are able
to foresee recovery with some reasonable degree of certainty and to make
clear whether the extrinsic-fact test will always be applied when oral
statements are not actionable on their face.
LANNY B. BRIDGERS
Torts-Liability of Physicians for Violation of Certification
Requirements in Commitment Process
The right of a mentally ill woman not to be restrained against her will
was the concern of the court in Di Giovanni v. Pessel.1 In affirming an
award of punitive damages against a physician whose false affidavit was
a substantial factor in the commitment of the plaintiff to a mental hos-
pital, the court aptly reflected intolerance toward the wilful and injurious
dereliction of a statutorily imposed duty. Unfortunately, convoluted
reasoning obscured the expression of this judicial intolerance.
The civil rights of the mentally ill have received close scrutiny in recent
years,2 and legislation has reflected concern for those rights." Generally,
statutes authorizing involuntary commitment require a judicial hearing
before commitment can be effected; commonly, these statutes require
medical certification as to the insanity of the individual involved before
commitment can be ordered. In case of an emergency whereby the indi-
vidual must be restrained immediately and there is insufficient time for
104 N.J. Super. 550, 250 A.2d 756 (Super. Ct., App. Div. 1969).
2 See, e.g., R. FARMER, THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY ILL (1967); F. LIND-
MAN & D. MCINTYRE, JR., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (1961)
[hereinafter cited as LINDMAN & McINTYRE]; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL
HEALTH, FEDERAL SEcuRiTY AGENCY, A DRAFT ACT GOVERNING HOSPITALIZATION
OF THE MENTALLY ILL (Public Health Service Pub. No. 51, 1952); R. Rocic,
M. JACOBSEN, & R. JANOPAUL, HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY
ILL (1968) [hereinafter cited as RocK]; Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the
Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I (1961); Curran, Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill, 31 N.C.L. REv. 274 (1953) ; Comment, The New Mental Health Codes:
Safeguards in Compulsory Commitnent and Release, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 977 (1967).
'See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§21-501 to -591 (1967). In its report to the
Senate when the bill was under consideration, the Senate Judiciary Committee ex-
pressed the hope that the act would serve as a model for revision of state hos-
pitalization laws. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PROTECTING THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY ILL, S. REP. No. 925, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1964).
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a hearing, judicial review is required shortly after hospitalization. For
one who is successfully committed, mandatory periodic review of his condi-
tion by medical authorities or habeas corpus assures that his confinement
is not continued after he regains his sanity.4
Despite this concern for the rights of the mentally ill, courts have
-found inherent difficulties in disposing of suits against doctors whose
alleged nonfeasance or misfeasance of statutory examination provisions
has resulted in an unjustified constraint, for the individual right of free-
dom must be balanced with the public interest and medical realities. More-
over, fitting the particular facts to a traditional cause of action may be
difficult. False imprisonment at first glance would seem to be an appro-
priate action since it evolved as a means to protect individual freedom
of movement.5 However, as will be demonstrated, this theory is limited
by the effect of a court order in those cases involving judicial hospitaliza-
tion. Malicious prosecution," abuse of process, conspiracy, and defama-
tion are other traditional theories upon which a plaintiff might rely in
seeking relief against a doctor who abuses his authority during a com-
mitment proceeding. But these actions also have inherent limitations,7
the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this note.
Another difficulty is that involvement by the judiciary in the commit-
ment process can raise a problem of privilege. For example, some courts
have accorded the certifying physicians an absolute immunity from any
'See Ln nmAN & MCINTYRE 15-40;, RocK 41-46.
5W. PnossEu, LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 54 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER].
I Malicious prosecution is similar to, and sometimes confused with, false im-
prisonment. It comprehends the malicious institution of a groundless action and
is directed against the one who instituted that action. To recover under malicious
prosecution, the plaintiff not only must show that the defendant instituted the
-groundless action, but he also must prove that the former proceeding terminated
in his favor and that the defendant maliciously and without probable cause insti-
tuted the action. See PROSSER § 12, at 61-62, § 113, at 853-55, § 114, at 870-75.
See generally Byrd, Malicious Prosecution in North Carolina, 47 N.C.L. Rv. 285
(1969). The dissenting opinion in Di Giovanni scored the majority for failing
to distinguish between malicious prosecution and false imprisonment; the majority
o pinion asserted that it was improbable that Dr. Pessel could be held liable for
malicious prosecution since he did not initiate or instigate the proceedings. 104
N.J. Super. at 564-68, 577, 250 A.2d at 763-65, 771.
'See generally as to abuse of process, PROSSER § 115, at 876-78; Byrd, Malicious
Prosecution in North Carolina, 47 N.C.L. Rnv. 285, 286-91 (1969); as to con-
spiracy, Cook v. Robinson, 216 Ga. 328, 116 S.E.2d 742 (1960); as to defamation,
Fisher v. Payne, 93 Fla. 1085, 1092, 113 So. 378, 380 (1927); Jarman v. Offutt,
239 N.C. 468, 80 S.E.2d 248 (1954). For a general discussion on liability con-
nected with commitment proceedings, see Note, Civil Liability of Persons Partici-
pating in the Detention of the Allegedly Mentally Ill, 1966 WAsH. U.L.Q. 193.
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civil action by virtue of their participation in a legal proceeding," and
others have granted a qualified immunity.9 The act of examination has
been held on at least one occasion to be a prerequisite to acquiring any
immunity.10 One court has characterized the nature of charges involving
alleged nonfeasance or misfeasance of the certification requirement as a
libel action from which the physicians would be absolutely immune by
virtue of their privileged status as witnesses in a judicial proceeding.'
Di Giovanni spawned difficulties even though the facts were un-
disputed. The plaintiff, Mrs. Di Giovanni, had suffered from a deteri-
orating mental condition for over a year. During this period, she had
been examined and treated on several occasions by Dr. Pessel, an in-
ternist, who last saw her in March, 1965. Aware that her condition was
growing worse he suggested to plaintiff's family in July, 1965, that she
be hospitalized for psychiatric treatment. The family instituted commit-
ment proceedings shortly thereafter.' 2
One of the New Jersey statutes governing hospitalization of the men-
tally ill' 3 requires examination of the patient by two physicians at the insti-
tution of the action for commitment. The physicians must certify that the
patient is insane; and, of critical importance in the Di Giovanni case, every
certificate must "set forth the date of the making of the personal examina-
tion of the subject of the action, which must be made in every case by
the physician signing the certificate not more than ten days prior to the
admission of such person to the institution .. . ."" In addition the ob-
served condition must be described in the certificates."
Accordingly, the family of Mrs. Di Giovanni obtained certification
from a psychiatrist, Dr. Borrus, who stated that she needed hospitalization
8 E.g., Dabkowski v. Davis, 364 Mich. 429, 111 N.W.2d 68 (1961); Linder v.
Foster, 209 Minn. 43, 295 N.W. 299 (1940).
'E.g., Christopher v. Henry, 284 Ky. 127, 143 S.W.2d 1069 (1940) (logic and
good faith perform a prominent part in determining liability).
"' See Beckham v. Cline, 151 Fla. 481, 10 So. 2d 419 (1942). Compare Suke-
forth v. Thegen, - Me. -, 256 A.2d 162 (1969) with Dunbar v. Greenlaw, 152
Me. 270, 128 A.2d 218 (1956).
1 Fowle v. Fowle, 255 N.C. 720, 122 S.E.2d 722 (1961); Bailey v. McGill,
247 N.C. 286, 100 S.E.2d 860 (1957), noted in 36 N.C.L. Rnv. 552 (1958). See
also Jarman v. Offutt, 239 N.C. 468, 80 S.E.2d 248 (1954).
12 104 N.J. Super. at 556-58, 250 A.2d at 759-60.
11 N.J. STAT. ANx. § 30:4-29 (1964), as amended (Supp. 1969). For the pur-
pose of this note the amended statute does not vary substantially from the former
statute.
I Id. § 30:4-30 (1964).
I 5Id. § 30:4-37 (1964).
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"for her welfare, observation, and treatment."' 6 Because of difficulty
in arranging another examination by any local psychiatrist, they pre-
vailed upon Dr. Pessel to provide the other certificate. He agreed to
furnish it without examining her, on condition that a psychiatrist confirm
his diagnosis. In August he falsely certified that he had examined Mrs.
Di Giovanni within the requisite period and had found her in need of
immediate restraint for her own safety and the safety of her relatives. 7
The family then obtained an order of temporary commitment from a
local municipal court,'" and the seventy-three-year-old lady was committed
to a mental hospital operated by Carrier Clinic. She was discharged about
one month later and subsequently brought actions against the clinic
and the two doctors for malpractice and false imprisonment. The trial
judge, after the presentation of all evidence, granted Carrier's motion for
summary judgment, dismissed the malpractice claims against the two
doctors, but ruled as a matter of law that the doctors were liable for false
imprisonment. He further ruled that the plaintiff's indisputable need for
psychiatric treatment preempted recovery of compensatory damages and
that the jury would be asked only to determine the amount of punitive
damages9
On appeal the Superior Court affirmed the judgment for Carrier,20
affirmed the dismissal of the malpractice claims,21 and reversed the
ruling against Dr. Borrus22 while affirming judgment against Dr. Pessel.
One justice wrote the court opinion for all holdings except the ruling
against Dr. Pessel, from which he dissented (dissenting opinion). Another
wrote the court opinion affirming the ruling against Dr. Pessel (majority
opinion), and the third justice wrote an opinion concurring in the result
(concurring opinion).
Since the facts were undisputed, it remained for the justices to deter-
mine whether the trial judge was correct in finding false imprisonment
"0 104 N.J. Super. at 570, 250 A.2d at 767.
" Id. at 556-58, 568, 250 A.2d at 759-60, 766.8 N.J. STAT. AxN. § 30:4-37 (1964).
s" 104 N.J. Super. at 554-55, 250 A.2d at 758.
20 id. at 554, 559-61, 250 A.2d at 758, 761-62. The court found no proof of
negligence and no false imprisonment because the municipal magistrate authorized
the confinement.2 11 id. at 561-63, 250 A.2d at 762-63. There'was no proof of a standard of
medical practice to which Dr. Borrus allegedly failed to adhere and no proof
of injury as to Dr. Pessel.
2Id. at 563-64, 250 A.2d at 763. Defective notarization of the affidavit was
held insufficient to impose liability.
23 Id. at 568, 250 A.2d at 766.
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as a matter of law. In contemplating the issue of false imprisonment, the
court followed the Restatement (Second) of Torts which defines the
elements of the action in this manner:
An Actor is subject to liability to another for false imprisonment
if
(a) he acts intending to confine the other or a third person within
boundaries fixed by the actor, and
(b) his act directly or indirectly results in such a confinement of the
other, and
(c) the other is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it.24
The majority summarily declared that "[ilt can scarcely be denied that
the essential elements of this tort thus defined in the Restatement have
been established in the case of Dr. Pessel."25
The court then faced the question whether any legal justification for
the constraint of Mrs. Di Giovanni's person existed. Legal justification,
of course, would defeat recovery under false imprisonment.20 To dis-
count the possibility of this defense, the court advanced two theories.
First, it stated that Dr. Pessel's conduct in knowingly making a false
certificate was legally indefensible and sufficient of itself to justify the
award of punitive damages." Second, it asserted that the plaintiff's condi-
tion was not sufficient as a matter of law to justify involuntary commit-
ment. In reference to the latter theory, New Jersey courts have narrowly
limited the degree of mental illness warranting immediate involuntary
restraint. As described in the majority opinion, "[t]he general test as
to the nature of the insanity warranting immediate involuntary restraint
is whether there is a danger that the patient may injure herself or some
other member of the public."' 28 The proof did not manifest this degree of
2
'RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 35 (1965).
104 N.J. Super. at 571, 250 A.2d at 767-68.
Id. at 571-72, 250 A.2d at 768. See Kraft v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 220
Ore. 230, 244, 348 P.2d 239, 243 (1959); Mailey v. De Pasquale's Estate, 94 R.I.
31, 34-35, 177 A.2d 376, 379 (1962).
104 N.J. Super at 571, 250 A.2d at 768.
" Id. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-37 (1964) merely demands the doctor to exercise
his judgment whether the condition of the patient is sufficient to warrant restraint.
Under N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-63 to -64 (1964), need of observation and treat-
wient is the standard for commitment. These statutes are typical of the vague
guidance legislatures have provided for determining the degree of mental illness
that warrants involuntary commitment. This vagueness is disturbing in a
libertarian sense, for freedom is too precious to be subjected to the caprice of am-
biguity. Significantly, the United States Congress has authorized the District
Court for the District of Columbia to order involuntary hospitalization only if a
[Vol. 48
LIABILITY OF PHYSICIANS
insanity in Mrs. Di Giovanni's case although she obviously needed certain
treatment; but, according to the majority opinion, the fundamental in-
quiry was whether the treatment needed necessitated involuntary confine-
ment. Dr. Borrus did not indicate such a necessity in his affidavit; neither
did the record of her hospitalization, which was considered to be of con-
trolling significance. 9 Since involuntary restraint was not necessary and
the doctor's conduct was legally indefensible, there was no legal justifica-
tion for the restraint, the court seemed to reason."
Nowhere in the majority opinion is there a discussion of the effect
of the -court order of temporary commitment, but it should have been of
threshold concern because a valid court order negates the unlawfulness
of restraint essential in an action for false imprisonment. Such an order
provides legal justification for confinement, and hence a resulting im-
prisonment is not false; it is legitimate31 For this reason, involuntary
hospitalization resulting from a valid court order will not give rise to an
action for false imprisonment, even if the order had been obtained by
giving false information to the court.2  The concurring justice con-
cluded without elaboration that the magistrate's order of temporary com-
mitment should not insulate Dr. Pessel from responding in damages for
false imprisonment.3 3 The dissenting justice disagreed strongly and
asserted that the majority was rejecting the settled rule. 4 And indeed,
mentally ill person, because of his illness, is likely to injure himself or others if
allowed to remain at liberty. D.C. CODE ANN. § 20-545 (1967). For a view that a
fixed standard should not be developed, see Rocx, supra note 2, at 256-60. LiND-
MAN & McINTYRE, supra note 2, at 40, conclude that statutes should clearly ex-
press the degree of mental illness justifying involuntary hospitalization. For a
general discussion of this problem, see Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MicH. L. REv. 945, 954-60 (1959).
29 104 N.J. Super. at 573-74, 250 A.2d at 768-69.
'
0 Id. at 571-74, 250 A.2d at 767-69 (semble).
9 1Whitten v. Bennett, 86 F. 405 (2d Cir. 1898) ; O'Shaughnessy v. Baxter, 121
Mass. 515 (1877) ; Apgar v. Woolston, 43 N.J.L. 57, 58 (Sup. -Ct. 1881) ; Melton
v. Rickman, 225 N.C. 700, 703, 36 S.E.2d 276, 277-78 (1945) (by implication);
35 C.J.S. False Im4prisonment § 16 (1960). See Kraft v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 220 Ore. 230, 244, 348 P.2d 239, 243 (1959) ; Mailey v. De Pasquale's Estate,
94 R.I 31, 34-35, 177 A.2d 376, 379 (1962); 32 Am. Jun. 2d False Imprisonment
§§8, 66, 85 (1967).
" Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 237, 118 N.E.2d 356, 359 (1954); Pate
v. Stevens, 257 S.W.2d 763, 766-67 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953). See also C. BuRDIcK,
THrE LAW oF TORTS 303, 309 (4th ed. 1926); PROSSER § 12, at 62; 32 Am. JuR. 2d
False Inprisonment § 66 (1967).
104 N.J. Super. at 577, 250 A.2d at 771.
Id. at 564, 250 A.2d at 763. The dissent also disputed the matter of plaintiff's
condition and concluded that the proofs did evince a need for confinement. Id. at
566-67, 250 A.2d at 765.
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by focusing on the indefensibility of Dr. Pessel's conduct and the actual
condition of Mrs. Di Giovanni to the exclusion of the effect of the court
order, the majority does appear to reject the great weight of authority
and to establish its own notion of legal justification. Perhaps the pre-
vailing justices felt that the role of the magistrate was too perfunctory
to be considered a judicial act of the kind that should protect the doctor
from false imprisonment. If so, they could understandably ignore the
court order," but they did not articulate this view except possibly in-
ferentially by the general tone of their opinions.
The court perhaps could have shown absence of legal justification for
the confinement by asserting that the court order was invalid because
of the inadequate certification of Dr. Borrus. His certificate did not
manifest any emergency conditions justifying the immediate confinement
of Mrs. Di Giovanni;36 therefore, because of the previously discussed
judicial limitation on immediate involuntary restraint, his certificate was
insufficient to support an order of temporary commitment. The magistrate
could not validly issue the order without two proper affidavitsY7 Hence
his order arguably was invalid and did not provide legal justification for
the imprisonment. But this line of reasoning could lead to other compli-
cations. If it were accepted, Dr. Pessel could plausibly contend that the
magistrate's impropriety constituted an intervening, superseding cause
of the false imprisonment. 8 Since the certificates, in addition to the
order, constitute the warrant and authority for admission and detention
for a temporary period,"9 Carrier Clinic might not be so readily freed
Be LINDMAN & McINTYRE, supra note 2, at 23; cf. Sukeforth v. Thegen, - Me.
-, 256 A.2d 162, 163 (1969). Just how much discretion the magistrate has under
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-37 (1964) is not clear. Technically, his order of temporary
commitment institutes the inquiry into the sanity of the individual involved, but
his order follows in sequence the certification by the physicians. It seems logical
that he would not issue an order of temporary commitment without probable cause
to do so. Significantly, the plaintiff conceded, and the court apparently agreed,
that the magistrate's order authorizing the initial confinement of Mrs. Di Giovanni
was sufficient for Carrier to act upon. Although the majority felt that Dr. Pessel
could not rely on that order as a defense since he was aware of the defect in
procedure, the status accorded the order in regard to defendant Carrier indicates
that the magistrate's discretion is sufficient to constitute a meaningful judicial pro-
ceeding and is not perfunctory. 104 N.J. Super. at 559, 563, 577, 250 A.2d at 761,
763, 770.
104 N.J. Super. at 573, 250 A.2d at 768.
, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-29, -37 (1964).
"See PenneU v. Cummings, 75 Me. 163, 166-67 (1883); Niven v. Boland, 177
Mass. 11, 12-13, 58 N.E. 282, 282-83 (1900).
"' N.J. STAT. AN. § 30:4-37 (1964).
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from liability.40 Furthermore, one could argue that the magistrate should
be liable because he acted without legal authority by virtue of the same
defect.4 - These arguments serve to emphasize the need for legislative
attention in elucidating the degree of mental illness warranting invol-
untary hospitalization of the mentally ill.
After discussing the problem of legal justification, the court, next
examined the possibility of the existence of any immunity that might pro-
tect Dr. Pessel. Where a false imprisonment comprises an element of a
legal proceeding, a privilege is accorded the person who institutes that
proceeding. The privilege is the same as that of any person charged with
malicious. prosecution: He is not liable for any confinement, even though
illegal, and is shielded from liability for malicious prosecution by the
strenuous evidentiary requirements of that action. The basis of the
privilege is the public policy of encouraging private actions to enhance
public order. The court reasoned that the doctor did not fall into the
category of one who institutes or instigates the action and could not
thereby avail himself of the privilege. Neither could he be said to-fall
within the protected categories of judicial officers and those relying on the
judicial process, as Carrier Clinic, since he was cognizant of the fatal
defect. Too, public policy would be ill-served by-extending an immunity
to one who flouted the law as did Dr. Pessel4
Patently, the inexorable objective of the court was to enforce the
statutory provisions for involuntary commitment and to secure the
plaintiff's rights under those provisions. It is unfortunate, however, that
the court found it necessary to examine false imprisonment at length in
relation to the violation of the certification requirement. A prosaic, tech-
nical discussion of cause of action, legal justification, and privilege detracts
from the court's objective. This methodology raises the spectre of the
"forms of action [ruling] us from their graves."'' The same end could
have been achieved more simply, directly, and clearly by holding the
doctor liable for violation of a statutory duty that proximately resulted
in an injury-the unwarranted restraint of liberty. The gist of this
" Cf. Warner v. State, 297 N.Y. 395, 79 N.E.2d 459 (1948).
"See Pennell v, Cummings, 75 Me. 163, 166-67 (1883) (by implication); cf.
Warner v. State, 297 N.Y. 395, 404, 79 N.E.2d 459, 464 (1948) ; C. BurmicK, THE
LAW op TonTs 304 (4th ed. 1926).
"See note 6 supra.
"Di Giovanni v. Pessel, 104 N.J. Super. 550, 574-77, 250 A.2d 756, 769-70
(Super. Ct., App. Div. 1969).
"1 F. MAITLAND, TE FoRms OF ACTION AT COmmON LAW 2 (1954).
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civil action is the familiar concept of duty, violation of duty, injury, and
causation. If the legislature intended the statute to protect an individual
or class of individuals, an injurious breach of that statute should be action-,
able.45 The concept of "negligence per se" is closely analogous in that it
affords recognition of a standard of care legislatively dsigned for the
protection-of a clas§ of'persons, an unexcused violation of which will be
considered actionable negligence if it results in the contemplated type of
harm.4"
The dissenting and majority opinions expressed agreement that Dr,
Pessel's conduct constituted negligence, 47 and they reflected the idea that
an unnecessary confinement could be considered an, injury resulting from
that negligence.48 Although "negligence" 'seems somewhat of a misnomer,
due to the intentional and designed nature of his violation of the statute,40
the readiness of the court to so term it is pertinent 0 Since the majority
viewed the doctor's conduct as a substantial factor in causing the confine-
ment and viewed the restraint as unwarranted, the court had an adequate
basis to find liability with less effort and superficiality."',
The theory of liability just suggested is particularly applicable to
the certification statute involved in Di Giovanni inasmuch as its implicit
purpose, along with the other relevant statutes, is to assure that only
" See J. SALmOND, T3E LAw oF TORTS 467-74 (12th ed. 1957). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 286, 288 (1965).
See generally PROSSER § 35, at 202-03; 38 Am. JUR. Negligence § 158 (1941).
"104 N.J. Super. at 562-63, 571, 250 A.2d at 762-63, 767.
"id. at 566, 571, 250 A.2d at 765, 767.
IsPrice v. Phillips, 90 N.J. Super. 480, 485-86, 218 A.2d 167, 169 (Super.
Ct., App. Div. 1966); 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 1(7) (1966).
"The attitude o.f the New Jersey court is in sharp contrast to that of the
North Carolina Supreme Court manifested in Bailey v. McGill, 247 N.C. 286,
100 S.E.2d 860 (1957). One writer has suggested that a negligence action would
be appropriate under the circumstances in Bailey. Note, Torts-Physiians and
Surgeons-Liability for Signing a Certificate of Insanity Without Proper Exanina-
tion of the Alleged Lunatic, 36 N.C.L. REv. 552 (1958). However, the North
Carolina court in a repeat performance refused to recognize a negligence action
in Fowle v. Fowle, 255 N.C. 720, 122 S.E.2d 722 (1961).
"In Jackson v. Parks, 216 N.C. 329, 4 S.E.2d 873 (1939), involving a wrong-
ful commitment to a mental hospital, the court used language that is apropos. It
discounted the significance of whether the plaintiff, after arguing malicious prose-
cution in the court below, had changed his theory to abuse of process. "We do not
see how a choice either way in technical nomenclature could shorten the arm of the
Court in its attempt to reach justice between the parties .... [The complaint] is
sufficient . . . however the alleged mistreatment of the plaintiff may be legally
tagged. . . ." Id. at 332, 4 S.E.2d at 874. See also Keller v. Butler, 246 N.Y. 249,
254, 158 N.E. 510, 512 (1927); PRosSER § 1, at 3-4; Smith, Torts Without Par-
ticular Names, 69 U. PA. L. REv. 91 (1921).
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mentally ill persons ini real need of restraint are deprived of their liberty.
The impoiftance of requiring doctors to comply with such safeguards de-
mands stringency in enforcement; as the court recognized, an intentional
violation is indefensible."' Those courts that accord an extensive privilege
to certifying -physicians notwithstanding their wilful violation of their
duty to examine the subjects of the proceedings create a paradox-the law
immunizes defiance of the law. Criminal sanctions hardly seem appropri-
ate for conduct similar to Dr. Pessel's, which lacked malevolence or
wantonness. Professional discipline from the appropriate state medical
organization affords no relief to an improperly committed person. Fur-
thermore, it is very questionable whether courts should leave the enforce-
ment of state law to professional organizations.
Of course, under any theory of liability doctors would be protected
from spurious suits in which a negligent examination is alleged by the
arduous requirements of proof of medical malpractice.53 Actual necessity
for restraint because of danger to self and others should be a good defense
in a suit for wrongful commitment, for restraint would not be unwarranted
substantively even if it were obtained by procedural imperfection; hence
there would be no significant injury for which recovery would be merited.54
Holding Dr. Pessel directly liable for his intentional violation of the
certification statute would have provided perspicuous warning to certify-
ing doctors and would have boldly manifested the willingness of the
judiciary to enforce legislation protective of individual rights. Such a
holding also would have furthered the retreat from the "forms of action"
11 Di Giovanni v. Pessel, 104 N.J. Super. 550, 572, 250 A.2d 756, 768 (Super. Ct.,
App. Div. 1969); cf. Warner v. State, 297 N.Y. 395, 404, 79 N.E.2d 459, 464
(1948).
See Williams v. Le Bar, 141 Pa. 149, 21 A. 525 (1891) (per curiam).
' Miller v. West, 165 Md. 245, 248, 167 A. 696, 698 (1933) ; cf. Christopher v.
Henry, 284 Ky. 127, 136, 143 S.W.2d 1069, 1074 (1940). One could readily
speculate that the court in Di Giovanni might have allowed a monetary recovery
in order to effectuate an adamant policy of strict adherence to the certification
requirement even if the plaintiff had been so mentally ill as to be dangerous
to herself and others. This speculation is logical if concern for the conduct of
the doctor loomed larger than concern for the grief caused the plaintiff. It seems
doctrinaire, however, to consider one who is mentally ill to the degree warranting
immediate restraint to deserve compensation for an involuntary hospitalization
brought about through a faulty process. The policy of the certification statute is
nonetheless served by the actual result reached on the facts of Di Giovanni.
Even if the decision is limited to its facts, no rational doctor would risk violating
the statutory commitment procedure on the fortuity that the individual concerned
was actually insane to the requisite degree.
19701 '
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mentality. Despite its beclouding semantics, the decision is exemplary
insofar as it represents judicial intolerance of the wilful and injurious
dereliction of- statutorily imposed duty; it remains for another court to
achieve the same result in a more straightforward manner.
WILLIAm B. CRt7MPLER
